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Abstract 
The Innocence Project’s DNA exoneration database (2018) indicates that approximately 27% of 
wrongful conviction cases containing eyewitness evidence also included a composite or sketch1 
of the perpetrator. This statistic is alarming, given that composites are rarely used in criminal 
investigations (PERF, 2013), but not surprising considering “good” composites are notoriously 
difficult to construct (e.g., Wells, Charman, & Olson, 2005). It is well understood that 
eyewitness evidence can be particularly persuasive evidence of guilt for juries and thus we were 
interested in learning more about how defense attorneys prepare for trial with respect to this 
specific type of eyewitness evidence. The overall purpose of this study was to assess the level of 
knowledge, education, training, and litigation experience defense attorneys have regarding 
composites through a survey methodology. We hypothesized that participants would have some 
knowledge about general eyewitness identification issues but would mostly be poorly trained and 
educated on composites. We also hypothesized that defense attorneys would report having been 
relatively unsuccessful in their attempts to suppress composite evidence at trial.  The results 
supported our hypotheses. We anticipate that the results may benefit defense attorneys in future 
motions to suppress, both at trial and post-conviction hearings, and assist them in protecting their 
clients from wrongful conviction.  
  
																																																								1In this paper, the term “composite” will be used to refer to both composites and sketches unless 
there is a specific reference to artist rendered sketches.	
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What U.S. Defense Attorneys Know About Eyewitness Composites 
Based on the results of post-conviction DNA testing in the United States, it has been 
determined that the leading contributing factor to wrongful convictions is eyewitness 
misidentification (Innocence Project, 2018). Of the 356 wrongful conviction DNA cases to date, 
approximately 70% involved erroneous eyewitness identifications and testimony. Further, cases 
where a composite or sketch was involved in the wrongful prosecution of these individuals 
represent 27.2% of the “eyewitness” exonerees. This is a staggering number, as the use of 
composites is relatively rare in the criminal investigations (Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF), 2013). In their recent survey, PERF found that although 35% of the 592 agencies in the 
survey reported using composites as an investigative tool, the average number of composites 
created per agency in 2010 (of the 192 that reported using composites that year) was three, with a 
median of one. This data suggests that composites are not used that often in criminal 
investigations. To further complicate matters surrounding the reliability of composites, 90.9% of 
agencies in the PERF survey reported that they have no written policy for the construction or 
administration of composites, and thus the appear to be few “standards” for their use in police 
agencies. Given that composites appear to be overly represented in wrongful convictions, and 
that they are rarely used in criminal investigations, we aimed in this study to assess the level of 
knowledge, education, and training defense attorneys have with composites, as well as their 
efforts to suppress this generally unreliable form of evidence at trial. 
Facial Composite Systems and Facial Recognition Issues 
In many cases, the key piece of evidence that can link someone to a crime is a description 
of the perpetrator that was given by a witness or crime victim. The description is then used, in 
some way, to search for a potential suspect. In addition to showing witnesses photos, one of the 
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options available to law enforcement is to ask witnesses to create a composite or sketch of the 
perpetrator. Facial composites are created using composite systems, some are feature-based and 
others are based on holistic processing (Zahradnikova, Duchovicova, & Schreiber, 2016). 
Featured-based composite systems, such as Identikit, Photofit Kit, and Mac-a-Mug Pro, are 
designed so that the witness may input individual facial features so the system can create a 
complete facial composite (Kovera, Pappas, Penrod, & Thill, 1997). Holistic-based composite 
systems, such as E-FIT and PRO-fit, present the witness with a completed facial composite and 
the witness is then asked to edit the composite or select from a group of composites. Holistic-
based composite systems are preferred as research has shown that people process faces 
holistically, meaning that we do not generally process individual features but rather the face as a 
“whole” (Fodarella, Kuivaniemi-Smith, Gawrylowicz, & Frowd, 2015; McIntyre, Hancock, 
Frowd, & Langton, 2016; Richler & Gauthier, 2014; Rossion, 2013). Feature-based systems 
therefore do not properly reflect how we process faces. A lesser used alternative to computer 
software systems is the use of sketch artists. Sketch artists were used before the implementation 
of computer software systems and are still used today in some cases. Sketch artists sit with a 
witness and render a sketch based off of the description given by the witness. One of the issues 
created by this technique is that the composite can vary depending on the artist’s technique and 
expertise. Different artists can also render different composites due to interpretation from a 
witness’s description (Laughery & Fowler, 1980). Another issue with using a sketch artist is that 
they also work in a piecemeal fashion and therefore are not as effective as holistic composite 
software systems.  
 Frowd et al. (2005) examined whether there were differences in eyewitness identification 
performance across different holistic based composite systems (E-FIT, PROfit, FACES, and 
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EvoFIT) and sketch artists. Participants were asked to inspect a photograph of a celebrity and 
later construct a composite from one of the composite methods listed above. Evaluation was 
assessed by asking independent observers to name the composites either through matching 
(sorting) or by choosing a photograph from an array (line-up). The researchers found that 
composite naming was low (3% overall) and sketches were named best at 8%. The researchers 
also found that likeness to a suspect can be achieved, however, majority of the composites 
created could not be accurately identified. Finally, issues with creating an “accurate” facial 
composite can extend far beyond software systems. For example, if a witness has a poor memory 
for the perpetrator (e.g., due to distance, Lampinen, Erickson, Moore, & Hittson, 2014), the 
description and resulting composite will not be accurate.   
Effects of Composites on Eyewitness Identification 
 It would seem to be common sense that even if a witness created a composite that did not 
resemble the perpetrator, the witness should still be able to identify the perpetrator when given 
the opportunity at a lineup. However, research suggests that this may not be the case, in part due 
to the malleability of memory (e.g., Loftus, 2003; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Stoffels, 2013). 
Jenkins and Davies (1985) found that when witnesses were presented with a misleading 
(inaccurate) composite of a target, they were significantly more likely to misreport information 
about the target’s appearance. For example, in their study they used incorrect hairstyles or an 
added mustache in the misleading composite. Those who misreported the targets appearance 
would tell the researchers that the target had either a certain hairstyle or a mustache when the 
opposite was true. In a second experiment, Jenkins and Davies (1985) found that when a 
composite was shown to the witness prior to recall, this was more damaging to the eyewitness’s 
memory than seeing the composite immediately after the incident. During recall, if a witness has 
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the composite face freshly in their mind, the witness is more likely to select a person that 
resembles the composite, rather than their original memory (Wells & Hasel, 2007). 
Research has also shown that creating a composite may reduce the chances that a witness 
can later identify the perpetrator in a lineup (Topp-Manriquez, McQuiston, & Malpass, 2016; 
Wells et al., 2005). In one study (Kempen & Tredoux, 2012), researchers divided participants 
into three groups who had been exposed briefly to a target. The first group constructed 
composites, the second group of participants only viewed a composite, and the third group was a 
control and performed a distractor task. The researchers found that merely being exposed to a 
composite could contaminate the memory trace for the original target and constructing a 
composite decreases identification performance (Kempen & Tredoux, 2012).  
The overall results of the research described above show that there should be a concern 
among those in the criminal justice system about the use of composites in criminal investigations 
and proceedings. It would appear, based on the data, that composite evidence could easily be 
shown to be unreliable evidence and routinely suppressed in criminal proceedings. However, the 
Innocence Project data on the prevalence of composites in exoneration cases suggests otherwise. 
We aimed to explore potential reasons behind this suppression deficiency in the current paper.  
Effects of Eyewitness Testimony and Evidence on Innocent Individuals 
 When a major crime occurs, facial composites are often posted in public places or in 
newspapers, in the hopes that more witnesses will come forward to assist in the identification of 
the suspect. Therefore, a serious potential problem can occur when other witnesses or the general 
public view a facial composite that is not an accurate likeness of the actual perpetrator. If an 
innocent individual looks similar to the misleading composite, he or she may be at risk of 
becoming a victim of a misidentification (Innocence Project, 2009). Further, after a suspect has 
WHAT U.S. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS KNOW                                                                           9 
been “apprehended” on the basis of their resemblance to a composite, it is likely that law 
enforcement will place that suspect into a subsequent identification procedure, either a photo 
array or a live lineup. It should not be particularly surprising to anyone when a witness then 
selects this suspect from the photo array or lineup, as the suspect was selected based on their 
similarity to the witness’ composite. The issue here, however, is whether or not the composite 
was a good fit or representation to the actual perpetrator – the individual it was meant to 
represent. At this time, researchers have not found or created a “litmus test” for composites, 
which allow law enforcement (prosecutors, judges, juries) to make the critical determination of 
“accuracy”.  
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that both eyewitness testimony and eyewitness 
evidence can be highly incriminating at trial. In fact, the impact of eyewitness evidence is 
comparable to, or can even be more compelling than, several other forms of evidence, such as: 
physical evidence (McAllister & Bregman, 1986; Skolnick & Shaw, 2001), polygraph evidence 
(Myers & Arbuthnot, 1997), character evidence (Kassin & Neumann, 1997), alibis (McAllister 
& Bregman, 1989), and even confession evidence (Kassin & Neumann, 1997).  
What makes eyewitness testimony even more believable to juries and judges is the 
consistency and confidence of an eyewitness (e.g., Douglass & Pavletic, 2012). When an 
individual becomes a witness, they are usually subjected to some form of an identification 
procedure. Once the witness makes an identification that is determined to be a “positive ID” of 
the perpetrator, the witness is typically asked to make several additional identifications of that 
same person (e.g., at pre-trial hearings, at trial; Steblay & Dysart, 2016). This tends to make the 
witness not only more confident, but also more believable; a phenomenon referred to as 
confidence malleability (Douglass & Pavletic, 2012).  In addition to repeated identifications, 
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which is likely to happen in composite cases, merely telling a witness that they have made the 
correct identification decision can also cause a significant increase in confidence (Steblay, Wells, 
& Douglass, 2014). To prevent confidence malleability during composite construction, a report 
by the Innocence Project (2009) urges investigators to not add any comments or clues to what 
they think they know about the suspect when a witness is assisting with a composite. However, 
the results of repeated procedures and feedback following composite construction will likely 
have negative impacts on the veracity of the witness’ confidence statements both before and 
during trial testimony.  
Legal Professional’s Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification Issues 
 Research has shown that composites can be very unreliable and the presentation of 
unreliable evidence in a courtroom can have very serious consequences for an innocent 
individual (Innocence Project, 2018). The criminal justice system was designed to protect these 
individuals by providing them with a lawyer and an impartial jury. To investigate what these 
groups of individuals and others know about eyewitness accuracy, researchers have conducted 
(many) surveys to determine how knowledgeable the members of the criminal justice system are 
when it comes to eyewitness identification.  
 An early survey conducted by Brigham and WolfsKeil (1983) focused on what Florida 
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and private defense attorneys knew about eyewitness 
identification issues and their beliefs on these issues as they pertained to the courtroom. 
Participants were asked about their opinions on several aspects of eyewitness identification, 
including the amount of emphasis placed on eyewitness evidence by judges and juries. They 
found that prosecutors felt that eyewitness evidence is relatively accurate and that judges and 
juries put the right amount of emphasis on the evidence. Defense attorneys, however, felt that 
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eyewitness identifications are often inaccurate and are overemphasized by triers of fact.  
In the decades since Brigham and WolfsKeil’s (1983) study, it is unlikely that these 
beliefs have changed in significant ways. For example, Wise and Safer (2004) surveyed US 
judges and found that this sample was often wrong about important eyewitness issues, such as 
confidence being a good indicator of accuracy at trial. Five years later, Wise, Pawlenko, Safer 
and Meyer (2009) conducted a similar study that compared prosecutors and defense attorneys’ 
knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. They found that defense attorneys were 
significantly more knowledgeable than prosecutors on almost every issue discussed in the study, 
including stress, weapon focus, forgetting curve, mug-shot-induced bias, confidence-accuracy, 
and post-event information. Wise and colleagues did not ask participants about composite related 
evidence. When it comes to juror knowledge, many surveys have been conducted in various 
countries (Desmarais & Read, 2011). In a meta-analytic review of that data, covering over 30 
years of research, Desmarais and Read (2011) found that overall, jurors were less knowledgeable 
than experts (from Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001) on variables such as confidence 
malleability, question wording, alcohol intoxication, and attitudes and expectation. When jurors 
are compared to attorneys on eyewitness knowledge, attorneys appear to be more knowledgeable 
than jurors (Malavanti, Terrell, Dasse, & Weaver, 2014).  
 With the exception of Brigham and WolfsKeil (1983), the knowledge surveys described 
above have primarily adapted their questionnaires from two eyewitness expert surveys conducted 
by Kassin and his colleagues (1989; 2001). These surveys asked eyewitness experts to give their 
opinion on various eyewitness phenomena and their reliability to be presented in court. Neither 
Kassin survey, however, asked experts about composite related issues. To our knowledge, even 
with all of the adaptations to the questionnaire, no study has included composites, until now.  
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Causes of Unsuccessful Motions to Suppress Eyewitness Evidence 
One way to prevent unreliable evidence from being used against an individual is to file a 
motion to suppress the evidence with the goal of having a hearing and the result being that the 
evidence is suppressed. Unfortunately, motions to suppress (general) eyewitness identification 
evidence are rarely successful (Wells, Greathouse, & Smalarz, 2012). There are a number of 
reasons for this including flaws in the case law that is used in deciding suppression motions 
(Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977), the legal system’s tendency to underestimate the power of 
suggestive procedures and overestimate the reliability of witnesses, and the resistance to have a 
system that would seemingly deny victims the right to point out their assailants. 
Another component to unsuccessful motions is ineffectiveness of defense attorneys. 
Wells et al. (2012) describe a few actions defense attorneys can take that qualify them as 
ineffective, including not doing enough research, filing “boilerplate’ motions, meaning they only 
alter their motions slightly from one another and do not take the time (or have the time) to write 
original motions, and developing a defeatist attitude, as they spend a great deal of time and effort 
trying to get evidenced suppressed, only for the judge to grant the evidence admissible. The 
cycle of defeat eventually causes attorneys to file motions because it is part of their job, but they 
don’t put a lot of effort into them because they think that no matter what they do or how much 
effort they put in, the motions will always be unsuccessful. The researchers note that to combat 
these issues attorneys should update their motions to include the description of the perpetrator 
from the initial police report or the 911 call, as that is likely to be more accurate than the 
description given after the witness’s memory has been compromised (Manson v. Braithwaite, 
1977).  The researchers also note that attorneys should make use of expert witnesses at hearings 
rather than the trial itself as their testimony would be more beneficial in the former (Wells et al., 
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2012). 
Current Study 
 The primary purpose of the current study was to assess the level of knowledge, education, 
training, and experience that US defense attorneys have regarding composites. We hypothesized 
that defense attorneys would have some knowledge about eyewitness reliability issues and 
lineups, but would not be as knowledgeable about composites as they occur less frequently in 
actual cases. We also hypothesized that defense attorneys would be trained on eyewitness 
identification issues but not sufficiently trained on composites. We also predicted that defense 
attorneys would report having little success when attempting to have composite evidence 
suppressed in court. This prediction was based in part on the high percentage of individuals who 
were wrongfully convicted by an unreliable composite (Innocence Project, 2016) and the 
difficulty of having “general” eyewitness evidence suppressed at trial (Wells et al., 2012).  
Methods 
Participants 
The Cardozo School of Law National Forensic College email list was used to recruit 
participants2.  We were able to access the list through a written request to the Innocence Project 
and obtained an initial sample of 127 participants. In order for a respondent to be considered a 
participant they needed to have passed the bar and had experience practicing as a defense 
attorney (either public or private). After removing participants that did not fit the criteria to be 
																																																								2	The NFC is a weeklong college for criminal defense lawyers who are supervisors, trainers, and 
experienced litigators who are or will be the forensic science experts or point people in their 
jurisdictions. The college prepares attorneys to litigate complex forensic science issues 
strategically and with the support of the nation’s leading law firms and experts. Attendance is by 
invitation only.  	
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included in the study (i.e., those who did not provide the year they passed the bar or had never 
been a defense attorney), the final sample included 111 participants (63 females, 33 males, 15 
did not report gender) with an average age of 43.68 years, SD= 11.13. With respect to formal 
education, besides having a JD, 20.7% of participants also held a Master’s degree.  
Participants had passed the bar between 1977 and 2016 with the average year being 2001. 
While 96.4% said they were still practicing law, 3.6% participants responded that they were 
currently doing other work (e.g., an investigator, a law professor). When asked how many states 
the participants were authorized to work in, 64.0% said they only worked in one state, 28.8% 
were authorized to practice in two states, 5.4% can practice in three states, one participant (.9%) 
can practice in four states, and one participant (.9%) can practice in five states, M = 1.46, SD= 
.72. Overall, the number of states covered by our sample was 39 and the District of Columbia.  
To get a better understanding of our participants’ experience as defense attorneys, we 
asked where they have worked and for how long. The majority of our sample (83.8%) had public 
defender experience and had spent an average of 8.29 years (SD= 8.53) in this position.  Another 
38.7% of participants had private defense experience, M = 3.97 years, SD=7.30. We were also 
interested in seeing if our participants had experience in other legal settings. Interestingly 9.9% 
had prosecutorial experience, M = 0.34 years, SD= 1.18, 20.7% had been civil attorneys, M = 
1.22 years, SD = 3.62, and 38.7% noted that they had also worked in other legal positions, M = 
2.37 years, SD = 5.19, such as a mitigation specialist, law professor, or an investigator.  
Materials 
A composite questionnaire was developed that included a combination of closed and 
open-ended questions (Appendix A). The survey was divided into four sections: knowledge of 
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eyewitness issues, education and training, experience with composites, and demographic 
questions.  The survey was presented to participants using the platform SurveyMonkey.com.  
Knowledge questions. The questions asked were adapted from the Kassin et al. (2001) 
study. Our study used nine of the 30 statements from Kassin et al. (2001) because many of the 
questions did not fit the scope of our study and would have resulted in a lengthy survey. We also 
added three new questions related to composites, as the Kassin et al. (2001) study did not include 
composite statements. These statements were created based on the relevant literature concerning 
composites (see Appendix A).  Responses were given using a Likert-type scale ranging from 
‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, and we included a ‘not sure’ option.  
Education and training.  Participants were asked to respond to 15 statements that aimed 
to understand how they felt about their education and training in regards to being able to handle 
composite cases. The statements for education were asked in a ‘Yes’, ‘No’, and ‘Cannot Recall’ 
format. The statements for training were asked on a Likert-type scale ranging from ‘Strongly 
Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’, and included a ‘not sure’ option. For example, in regards to 
education, we asked, “In law school, I attended a class/seminar that covered facial composites.” 
and for training we asked, “I have received sufficient training on how to litigate cases that 
involve composite evidence.”  
Experience. This portion of the questionnaire was divided into two sections. The first 
asked the participants two questions regarding their courtroom experience with composite cases. 
Question one asked, “Approximately how many criminal defendant clients have you had over 
your career as a defense attorney?” The second question asked, “Over your career, 
approximately how many times have you had cases that meet the descriptions below?” The 
participants were then asked eight sub-questions that went into more detail about these cases. For 
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example, one sub-question stated, “My client was charged primarily on the basis of a positive 
eyewitness identification.” 
In the second Experience section, participants were asked three questions. The first asked 
participants if they have ever successfully litigated a motion to suppress a composite and how 
they feel they were able to be successful. The second question aimed to explore why motions are 
sometimes unsuccessful and do not get suppressed, so we asked the participants why they felt 
they were unsuccessful and what they felt they would do differently in future cases. The final 
question asked participants how they would explain composite evidence to a jury if a prosecutor 
brought one into evidence during a trial. We used open-ended questions for this section of the 
questionnaire because there is, to our knowledge, no published research on how defense 
attorneys litigate composite cases.  
Demographic questions. Participants were asked questions about their age, gender 
identity, and where they lived. Participants also were asked questions about being an attorney, 
such as the year they passed the bar, whether they are still practicing or retired, years of 
experience, various degrees they may have, the state(s) where they practice, and what type of law 
they practice.  
Procedure 
Participation requests were sent via email (Appendix B) to all of individuals on the 
Cordozo Law School Forensic College email list. The participants all were volunteers that were 
not individually compensated for their participation; however, we informed participants that 
there would a raffle with cash prizes for those that participated in the study.  The email included 
a link to the survey where participants were presented with the informed consent form (Appendix 
C). The participants were told that the results of the questionnaire might help forensic 
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psychologists and judicial organizations to create educational materials related to composites for 
defense attorneys. Participants then completed the questionnaire via Survey Monkey. We also 
provided an option for participants to receive a hard copy in the mail but no participant requested 
this option.  
The beginning of the survey reminded participants that their answers were confidential. 
The survey was constructed so that each section had its own page. When needed, comment boxes 
were provided that had an unlimited amount of characters. There was no time limit to how long 
the participants had to complete the survey and the participants were provided with an option to 
opt out at any time. Each page had instructions that informed participants what the purpose of 
each section was. After the survey was complete, participants were debriefed (Appendix D) and 
told that they could request a final copy of the results when the study was completed or contact 
the researchers if they had questions, comments, or concerns about the project. 
Results 
All open-ended questions were coded using two research assistants.  Where there were 
discrepancies in coding decisions, the coders discussed and resolved all differences. 
Eyewitness Knowledge  
Our first aim was to assess the level of general knowledge our defense attorney 
participants had on eyewitness identification topics with a special focus on composite-related 
topics. The questions used to assess this hypothesis were answered on a Likert-type scale but 
there was an answer for each question that we considered correct based on findings from 
empirical research and the Kassin et al. (2001) survey. For example, for true statements we 
considered “Strongly Agree” and “Somewhat Agree” correct; the inverse was used for false 
statements.  
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 When we looked at the overall responses, we found our participants correctly answered 
on average 7.54 (SD=. 80) of the nine eyewitness identification statements. Thirteen (12.5%) 
participants answered all nine statements correctly, and one person answered just five statements 
correctly (this was the lowest score). Of the three composite related statements, participants 
answered on average 1.48 questions correctly (SD=. 86), with nine (8.7%) participants answering 
all three statements accurately and 16 (15.4%) being inaccurate on all three composite 
statements. Overall, we found support for our hypothesis that our participants would be 
knowledgeable on eyewitness identification topics, as 95.2% answered seven or more questions 
correctly. We also found support for our hypothesis that participants would be somewhat less 
knowledgeable on composite- related issues, with only 54.9% of the participants answering two 
or more statements correctly. 
 Participants’ responses were then compared to the responses from eyewitness experts 
from Kassin et al.’s (2001) study. Since the participants in the Kassin et al. (2001) study were not 
asked composite related questions, we were only able to compare responses to the nine 
eyewitness questions (Table 1). There was no significant difference between the responses from 
the attorneys and the experts on majority of the items with the exception of ‘Stress’, X2 (1, N = 
175) = 27.10, p<.05, ‘Forgetting Curve’ X2 (1, N = 175) = 23.30, p<.05, and ‘Identification 
Speed’ X2 (1, N = 175) = 10.19, p<.05. Participants were more knowledgeable on the ‘Stress’ 
question and less knowledgeable on the ‘Forgetting Curve’ and ‘Identification Speed’ items. 
Other than these items, our participants answered similarly to the experts, and we can therefore 
conclude that they were quite knowledgeable on eyewitness identification topics included in the 
survey. 
Education and Training 
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The second set of hypotheses focused on defense attorneys’ training and education with 
composites. We asked defense attorneys about their previous education and training on 
eyewitness topics and asked them to respond with ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Cannot Recall’ (Table 2). We 
found that participants were highly trained with eyewitness identification topics, as 90.1% of 
Table 1.  
Percentage of agreement rate of defense attorneys on eyewitness knowledge questions adapted 
from Kassin et al. (2001) as well as composite related question taken from the literature review. 
 
     Defense Attorneys         Experts 
Topic (n=111) (n=64) 
Stress 100* 60 
Weapon Focus 100 87 
Forgetting Curve 41.3*  83 
Cross-Race Bias 94.2 90 
Unconscious Transference 94.2 81 
Identification Speed 27.9* 40 
Mugshot Induced Bias 98.1 95 
Accuracy and Confidence 100 87 
Post Event Information 98.1 94 
Common Composite Creations 9.8 N/A 
Composite Accuracy 58.7 N/A 
Participation Impact 79.8 N/A 
 
Note.  * Indicates a significant difference between dispatchers and experts at p <. 05. 
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participants responded to at least one of the education or training statements with a ‘yes’. 
However, we found that participants generally were not trained in composite related issues as 
only 20.8% of participants said ‘yes’ to at least one of the composite training questions. The 
majority of our participants (79.0%) had been trained through CLE courses. 
We also asked participants whether they felt their eyewitness training was self-taught, as 
cost and availability of CLE courses may not be an option for all defense attorneys. When asked 
about eyewitness knowledge, 57.4% said they were self-taught and 52.4% had self-taught 
knowledge when it came to composites. Finally, when asked if they felt properly trained on how 
to litigate eyewitness and composite cases, 45.0% of participants claimed they felt sufficiently 
trained on how to litigate eyewitness identification cases, while only 13.9% felt they were 
sufficiently trained on how to litigate composite-related cases. 
 
Table 2 
 
 
Location of Training/Education 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
 
Cannot 
Recall 
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Participant responses regarding where they were educated and trained on eyewitness 
identification topics. 
 
Knowledge through expert witnesses. Expert witnesses’ in the field of eyewitness 
identification give consultations (primarily) for defense attorneys and often give the attorney 
they are consulting with a ‘crash course’ on various eyewitness topics related to the facts of case. 
Being that consultations are more one-on-one and can span over a longer amount of time than a 
classroom or CLE presentation, we asked participants if they had ever consulted with an 
eyewitness expert in trial preparation. We found that 66.0% of participants have attempted to 
contact an expert and that 54.5% of participants had consulted with an expert witness. An 
additional 29.7% of participants actually had an expert testify at a hearing or trial. We 
understand that not every defense attorney has the time and financial resources to use an expert 
witness but we wanted to get an understanding of how attorneys value experts. When asked if 
they believed it would be helpful to consult with an expert on eyewitness identification issues, 
98.1% of participants agreed that it would be beneficial. When asked if it would be helpful to 
In law school, I attended a class/seminar that 
covered the topic of eyewitness identification.  
20.8%  
(21) 
74.3% 
(75) 
5.0%  
(5) 
In law school, I attended a class/seminar that 
covered facial composites.  
1.0%  
(1) 
96.0% 
(107) 
3.0%  
(3) 
Since graduating from law school, I have 
attended at least one (CLE) session in which the 
topic of eyewitness identification was covered.  
79.0%  
(79) 
18.0% 
(18) 
3%  
(3) 
Since graduating from law school, I have 
attended at least one (CLE) session in which the 
topic of facial composites was covered.  
19.8%  
(20) 
74.3% 
(75) 
5.9%  
(6) 
I have consulted with an eyewitness identification 
expert in trial preparation.  
54.5%  
(55) 
44.6% 
(45) 
1.0%  
(1) 
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consult with an expert on composite-related issues, 99.0 % of participants agreed that it would be 
beneficial.  
Litigation confidence. Given our (supported) hypothesis that defense attorneys would be 
poorly trained in composite-related cases, we wanted to know how confident they felt in their 
ability to proficiently litigate these cases. Over two-thirds of our sample (69.3%) were confident 
in their abilities to proficiently litigate an eyewitness identification-related case whereas only 
30.3% of participants had confidence in their ability to litigate composite-related cases.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, 16.9% of participants were not confident in their ability to litigate an 
eyewitness case and more than half (50.5%) were not confident that they could proficiently 
litigate a composite related case.  
Courtroom Experience with Composites 
Our final hypotheses focused on the experiences of defense attorneys in the courtroom 
when they defend composite cases. To better understand the participants’ level of experience, we 
asked about the number of clients they have had over their career and some characteristics of the 
charges their clients had faced. The total number of criminal defendant clients represented by our 
participants (n =98) was 126,443. Within that number 2,304 clients (1.8%) were charged 
primarily based on eyewitness identification evidence and a total of 409 clients (0.3%) were 
charged in part (310) or entirely (99) because of their similarity to a composite. Forty-eight of 
the participants represented the 310 clients that were charged in part because of their similarity to 
a composite and of those participants, 28 of them represented the 99 clients who were charged 
entirely because of their similarity to a composite.  When asked if they had ever filed a motion to 
suppress composite evidence (and how many), 11 participants said they had, for a total of 43 
motions to suppress composite evidence. In other words, in only 10.5% of cases where a 
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composite was present and used to implicate the defendant did the defense attorney file a motion 
to suppress that evidence. Only four participants stated that a judge granted them a hearing based 
on their motion, for a total of 17 hearings. And of the four participants who had a hearing, only 
one person was able to successfully have the evidence suppressed and they did this a total of 
three times. That is, composite evidence, a notoriously unreliable form of identification evidence, 
was suppressed in 0.7% of cases.   
When asked how many of their clients were convicted through plea bargain or trial 
primarily on the basis of a positive eyewitness identification, 82 participants said that 1,534 of 
their clients were convicted.  That means that of the 2,304 clients charged based on eyewitness 
evidence, 66.6% were convicted. When asked how many of their clients were convicted through 
plea bargain or trial in part because of their similarity to a composite, 29 participants said that 
102 clients were convicted. That means that of the 409 clients charged based in part or entirely 
on similarity to a composite, 24.9% were convicted. 
Participants’ Attempts To Litigate Motions to Suppress 
To gain a better insight as to why defense attorneys are unsuccessful at suppressing 
composites, we analyzed their responses to our open-ended questions. We examined 
participants’ perceptions of success and of failure, and descriptions of strategies used to defend a 
composite case at trial. We had very few participants (7) who responded to our open-ended 
questions and therefore it was not possible to develop themes with this small sample.  
The first question asked participants why they believe they were successful in having a 
composite suppressed. We only received one response, which was expected given our findings 
above. This participant wrote “A combination of the use of expert testimony for my client, the 
sketch artist's lack of training/experience and the perceiving witness's lack of certainty." 
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The second question we asked participants was, “If you have filed a motion to suppress a 
composite sketch and were unsuccessful, please describe why you believe your motion was 
denied and what you would do differently in the future when trying to suppress composite sketch 
evidence.” Out of the seven participants who responded, four felt that they were unsuccessful 
due to issues with the judge. Others felt that they were unsuccessful due to a lack of resources, 
the unfavorable case law in the state where they were trying the case, or that they simply lacked 
the basis for suppression of evidence. For future cases, five participants noted that they should 
use an expert witness. Others noted that it would be important to use more science, affidavits, 
and/or motions and to do a much more aggressive discovery of the sketch artist’s 
training/experience. Below is a response from one of the participants that describes the 
complexities of these cases and the many factors that go into each case: 
The judge simply lumped the arguments in with the Wade/other ID issues and did not 
decide it as a separate issue.  I would file two separate motions to make it much more 
clear.  I also would speak to an expert in that field to see about better ways of filing such 
a motion.  I have only had one case where a composite sketch was used in all my years as 
a defense attorney. 
 
The third and final question we asked was, “If you have litigated a case where the 
prosecution introduced a witness’ composite, please describe the strategies you used to explain 
the composite evidence to the jury. Feel free to use specific examples”. We received responses 
from six participants to this open-ended question. One participant “used an eyewitness 
identification expert to describe the research on how composite sketches affect the witnesses' 
memories.” The other five participants used discrediting strategies. As an example:  
I have tried a few with sketches but that was before experts were allowed. In one, the 
Commonwealth chose not to use the composite. In another, the sketch was produced 
months after the incident, and (I thought) looked little like my client. I used his arrest 
photo and the sketch side by side to show the dissimilarities. In another I compared the 
sketch to a jigsaw puzzle shoved together where it looked okay from a distance, but up 
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close you could see it didn't really look like him at all. 
 
The responses given by the participants indicate that judges may be one of the key factors 
in unsuccessful motions. As mentioned in the literature review, judges tend to know less about 
eyewitness identification issues and yet the still find the evidence to be believable (Wise & Safer, 
2004; Douglass & Pavletic, 2012). The participants also noted the importance of expert 
witnesses, which is consistent with our findings earlier in the section when we asked participants 
how they valued experts. This finding is also consistent with the recommendation given by 
Wells, Greathouse, and Smalarz (2012), who noted the importance of using expert witnesses in 
hearings.  
Discussion 
 Previous research has attempted to assess what judges, experts, and lawyers know about 
eyewitness identification issues (Brigham & Wolfskeil, 1983; Kassin et al., 1989; Kassin et al., 
2001; Wise & Safer, 2004; Wise et al., 2009). What these studies lacked, however, was an 
assessment of knowledge concerning composites. This study sought to fill a gap in our 
knowledge of composites by asking defense attorneys about their overall experience with and 
knowledge of composites. This is an important area for investigation because the presence of 
composite evidence in DNA exoneration cases is substantially higher than their use in criminal 
investigations. We hypothesized that participants would have some knowledge about general 
eyewitness identification issues (because this type of evidence is common) but would be less 
trained and educated on composites. The results showed that our sample of defense attorneys 
were very knowledgeable about eyewitness identification issues, as they answered quite similarly 
to experts in the field. In fact, because we sampled from the Cardozo Law School National 
Forensic College sample, we likely had a more educated group of defense attorneys than is 
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representative of defense attorneys across this United States. Thus, the lack of confidence in their 
ability to proficiently litigate composite cases and the paucity of successful motions to suppress 
are likely indicative of a larger problem nationally.  
We also found that the vast majority of participants had been trained on eyewitness 
issues. This knowledge and training appears to have come from a variety of sources, including 
CLE courses, expert witness consultations, law school, and from their own experiences in the 
field (i.e. self-taught). In contrast, and as expected, we found participants to be less 
knowledgeable and trained on composite-related issues. Therefore, it was not surprising that over 
half the participants reported that they did not feel that they had sufficient training on how to 
litigate composite cases. This was not a reflection of general litigation confidence, as nearly 70 
percent of respondents felt confident in their ability to proficiently litigate an eyewitness case. In	summary,	participants	felt	that	they	lacked	sufficient	training	on	both	eyewitness	issues	and	composite	issues.	However,	in	both	cases,	the	participants	gave	higher	levels	of	confidence	to	litigate	these	cases.	One	explanation	for	this	could	be	that	being	self-taught	can	boost	an	attorney’s	confidence,	as	we	found	that	nearly	half	of	the	participants	are	self-taught	in	both	eyewitness	and	composite	cases.	Another	explanation	for	this	could	be	past	experiences.	Overall,	this result suggests that more training and education on the topic of 
composites needs to be included in future CLE courses that address eyewitness identification.  
  In the field of forensic psychology, we know how invaluable expert witnesses are to 
court cases; their testimony educates judges and juries and can be vital to combating unreliable 
evidence. Our participants also seemed to hold expert witnesses in high regard, as nearly all 
participants viewed experts as a vital tool to use when preparing for trial and many had attempted 
to contact experts and consult with them during trial preparation. In an ideal world, where every 
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defense attorney has a manageable caseload and there are a sufficient number of eyewitness 
identification expert witnesses willing and available to assist, we would expect to see expert 
witnesses used more in trial preparation (and at hearings and trials). So, while it may seem like a 
low number of participants in our study actually ended up calling an expert to testify during a 
hearing or trial (29.7%), we believe that this figure is actually quite high. In comparison to the 
frequency with which defendants across the United States are charged, in part, due to eyewitness 
evidence, there are very few eyewitness identification expert witnesses available to testify in 
criminal cases. Further, budget constraints on public defender services may not allow for an 
expert witness to be hired. Thus, increased funding and additional training of expert witness is 
also recommended as a partial solution to increased training for defense attorneys. 
 Consistent with research on motions to suppress identification evidence (Wells et al., 
2012), our final hypothesis predicted that participants would report having been generally 
unsuccessful in their attempts to suppress composite evidence at trial. In fact, we found that 
participants were decidedly unsuccessful at having their motions suppressed. From the entire 
sample, only one person was able to successfully have their motions granted (three times). 
Another jarring discovery is how few of the participants actually filed a motion to suppress 
composite evidence; 11 participants to be precise. While we cannot speak for exact reasons 
based on our survey, evidence from the literature gives a possible explanation. As mentioned in 
an earlier section, defense attorneys may develop a defeatist attitude due to the fact that (it would 
appear) no matter how much effort they put into their motions, judges consistently deny them 
(Wells et al., 2012). It is possible that defense attorneys would rather put their energies into the 
trial itself instead of filing motions to suppress evidence they believe will nonetheless be 
admitted at trial. For those that had filed motions to suppress composite evidence, they believed 
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they were unsuccessful because of an issue with the judge(s). They also felt that they should 
have had an expert witness give their testimony to the judge in an effort to educate the judge on 
the issue at hand. A consequence to these motions being unsuccessful is that individuals are 
being convicted based, in part, on unreliable evidence. We are not suggesting that every person 
convicted of a crime based, in part, on eyewitness evidence is innocent. However, convicting 
individuals on the basis of notoriously unreliable evidence is contrary to the fair administration 
of justice.  
 As with all research, our study had a few limitations. First, using survey methodology, it 
was not possible to assess the full level of (nuanced) knowledge that our participants may have 
about eyewitness identification and composite issues. This is due in part to time constraints and 
the use of a questionnaire, as opposed to a dynamic interview where follow-up questions could 
be asked. Our study was also limited in that we had a small sample size. A larger sample size 
from a variety of different sources would likely yield results that resemble the general population 
of defense attorneys. Thus, we believe that our results likely overestimate the knowledge and 
training that defense attorneys have across the country as well as their “success” in motions to 
suppress composite evidence. 
We believe that future research on this topic should ask attorneys to provide redacted 
copies of the motions to suppress that they have submitted in actual cases. The redaction would 
be important for confidentiality of the participant as well as their client(s). In addition, future 
research should collect transcripts of suppression hearings to see what arguments were made by 
the defense attorneys and prosecutors. Any written decisions made by the judges in these cases 
would also be useful to assist in determining why a motion was successful or denied. On this 
issue, most of our participants gave general explanations for the motion’s failure, such as an 
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issue with the judge. Future research should also adapt this survey and administer it to judges to 
examine what they know about composites, how reliable they view the evidence, and why they 
often deny motions to suppress the evidence.  
 Decades of scientific research has shown that composite evidence is extremely unreliable. 
It is our hope that this study can aid defense attorneys in their future composite cases and aid in 
the (appropriate) suppression of this unreliable evidence by further educating judges on this 
issue. We hope that this study inspires change in the criminal justice system by advancing the 
knowledge of all of the members of the court on composites and helping protect innocent 
individuals from being wrongfully convicted.  
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Appendix A 
 
Composite Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practice history
2. In what state/territory do you currently reside?*
3. In what year did you pass the bar?*
4. Are you currently practicing law?*
Yes
No, I am retired
Other (please specify)
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5. In what states are you (or have you been) licensed to practice law? Select all that apply.*
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Guam
Puerto Rico
US Virgin Islands
Other (please specify)
Public defender
Private defense attorney
Prosecutor
Civil attorney
Other 
6. Please indicate the number of years you have been (or were) employed in each position listed below.
Enter "0" if applicable.
*
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The following questions examine your knowledge in the area of eyewitness identification. 
Eyewitness Questions
 Strongly
agree Agree
Neither
agree or
disagree Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Not
sure
Very high levels of stress can impair the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
The presence of a weapon can impair an eyewitness’s ability to accurately
identify the perpetrator’s face.
The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after the event and then
levels off over time.
Eyewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their own
race/ethnicity than members of other races/ethnicities.
Eyewitnesses sometimes identify someone they have seen in another context
as a culprit to a crime, instead of the actual perpetrator.
The quicker an eyewitness makes a positive identification, the more accurate
he or she is likely to be.
7. Please select your level of agreement for each statement below.*
 Strongly
agree Agree
Neither
agree or
disagree Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Not
sure
Exposure to mug shots of a suspect increases the likelihood that the witness
will later choose that suspect from a lineup.
An eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors that are unrelated to
identification accuracy.
Eyewitness testimony about an event can reflect not only what they actually
saw but information they obtained after the event.
In the United States, the most common technique that is used to produce facial
composites is the use of a police sketch artist.
Eyewitnesses typically produce facial composites that accurately portray the
perpetrator.
Participating in the creation of a facial composite will have no impact on an
eyewitness' later ability to recognize the perpetrator (e.g., from a lineup).
8. Please select your level of agreement for each statement below.*
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The following questions are related to your training and experiences with eyewitness identification
and facial composite cases. Please answer as accurately as you can.
Training and Education
 Yes No Cannot recall
In law school, I attended a class/seminar that covered the topic
of eyewitness identification.
In law school, I attended a class/seminar that covered facial
composites.
Since graduating from law school, I have attended at least one
(CLE) session in which the topic of eyewitness identification was
covered.
Since graduating from law school, I have attended at least one
(CLE) session in which the topic of facial composites  was
covered.
I have consulted with an eyewitness identification expert in trial
preparation.
I have had an eyewitness identification expert testify at a hearing
or trial.
I have never attempted to contact an eyewitness expert.
9. Please select the best answer for each question below.*
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 Strongly
agree
Somewhat
agree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree Not sure
My knowledge about eyewitness identification is self-taught.
My knowledge about composite sketches is self-taught.
I have received sufficient training on how to litigate cases that
involve eyewitness identification evidence.
I have received sufficient training on how to litigate cases that
involve composite sketch evidence.
I am confident that I can proficiently defend a case
where eyewitness identification plays a significant role in the
state's case against my client.
I am confident that I can proficiently defend a case where a
composite sketch plays a significant role in the state's case
against my client.
It would be helpful to consult with an eyewitness identification
expert when preparing to litigate an eyewitness identification
case.
It would be helpful to consult with an eyewitness identification
expert when preparing to litigate a case that includes composite
sketch evidence.
10. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements.*
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Experience
11. Approximately how many criminal defendant clients have you had over your career as a defense
attorney?
*
 Number of cases
My client was charged primarily on the basis of a positive eyewitness identification.
My client was charged - in part - because of his/her similarity to a composite sketch.
My client was charged almost entirely on the basis of his/her similarity to a composite sketch.
I filed a motion to have a composite sketch suppressed.
Based on my motion, the judge held a suppression hearing and heard evidence on the composite sketch.
I was successful in my motion to have the composite sketch suppressed.
My client was convicted - through plea bargain or trial - primarily on the basis of a positive eyewitness
identification.
My client was convicted - through plea bargain or trial - in part because of his/her similarity to a composite
sketch.
12. Over your career, approximately how many times have you had cases that meet the descriptions
below?
*
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Lastly, we have a few open-ended questions that go into more detail about the cases you have had
involving composite sketches.  Please write as much as you like for these open-ended questions
but do not include any identifying information about your client.
Open Ended
13. If you have successfully litigated a motion to suppress a composite sketch, please describe why you
believe you were successful in having the sketch suppressed.
14. If you have filed a motion to suppress a composite sketch and were unsuccessful, please describe
why you believe your motion was denied and what you would do differently in the future when trying to
suppress composite sketch evidence.
15. If you have litigated a case where the prosecution introduced a witness’ composite sketch, please
describe the strategies you used to explain the composite sketch evidence to the jury. Feel free to use
specific examples.
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Finally, we need some basic information about you for our analyses. 
Demographics
16. What is your age?
17. What is your gender?
Female
Male
Prefer not to say
Other (please specify)
18. What degrees you have earned? Select all that apply.*
PhD
JD
Master's
Bachelor's
Associate's
Other (please specify)
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Appendix B 
 
Email Request 
 
Dear Potential Participant, 
 
I am writing to let you know about a study being conducted by Marisa Jaross and Dr. Jennifer 
Dysart at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. We received your email from the NACDL [or 
Innocence Project] list serves. The purpose of this research study is to gain a better 
understanding of what defense attorneys know about eyewitness identification and, in particular, 
composite sketches.  
 
If you are a defense attorney practicing in the United States, you are eligible to participate in this 
study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. Although you will not be paid for 
participating, we will be holding a raffle with three cash prizes for those who do participate. 
Whether or not you participate in this study, it will have no effect on your relationship with John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice or NACDL [The Innocence Project]. 
 
If you are interested in learning more, please click on the link to the survey. This will take you to 
a consent form that requires you to read the form. If you continue to the survey we assume that 
you have read the potential risks for this study. We will not be asking for signatures to ensure 
that your answers will remain anonymous. If you would like to participate but do not wish to do 
the survey online, email us and we will send you a hard copy of the survey as well as a pre-paid 
return envelope.  
 
There is no need for you to respond if you are not interested in participating in this study.  If you 
do not respond you may receive a follow-up email that you can simply disregard.   
 
Thank you for your time and consideration.  
 
Sincerely,  
Marisa Jaross & Dr. Jennifer Dysart 
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Appendix C 
 
Consent Form 
 
Dear Research Participant,  
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this important research on composite sketches 
used in eyewitness identification cases. You have been given a link to this survey on composite sketches 
because you are a defense attorney who practices or practiced in the United States. If you are not a 
defense attorney or were not a defense attorney, we apologize for any inconvenience and thank you for 
your time.  
The purpose of this research study is to assess the level of knowledge, training, education, and experience 
that defense attorneys have with composite sketch cases. The results of the survey will be distributed 
nationally to assist defense attorneys when preparing to defend a case that involves a composite sketch 
created by an eyewitness.  
If you volunteer to participate in this research study, we will ask you to answer questions pertaining to 
eyewitness identification cases generally, followed by questions specifically related to composite 
sketches. We will also ask you to provide demographic information that will assist in our analyses and the 
distribution of the results. We expect the survey to take between 15 and 30 minutes, depending on how 
much information you would like to provide. Your results will be kept confidential.  
Risks and Benefits:  
If you feel any discomfort as a result of answering the questions in this survey, you can withdraw your 
participation at anytime without any penalty or punishment. If you decide at any point in time during the 
study that you wish to withdraw, you may click the “Withdraw” button on the screen. The screen will ask 
whether you want to leave an incomplete survey or discard all answers. Just choose one choice and the 
screen will allow you to withdraw from the survey.  
Although you may not directly benefit from your participation in this research study, we hope that other 
defense attorneys will benefit. Based on the possible publication of the results of this study, defense 
attorneys may be able to utilize the findings to aid in their defense of composite sketch cases.  
Compensation for participation:  
Although you will not be paid for participation, we are providing a lottery and will randomly choose five 
participants to receive a cash reward. The first three winners will receive $100 each and another two 
winners will receive $50. Entry into the lottery is optional and is only open for those who complete the 
survey.  
New Information:  
As required by ethics regulations, you will be notified about any new information regarding this study 
that may affect your willingness to participate.  
* 1. To consent to participate in this survey, please select "Yes" below.  
  Yes, I agree to participate  
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Appendix D 
 
Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for participating in this study! The general purpose of this research is to assess the level of 
knowledge, education, training, and experiences that defense attorneys have about composite sketches.  
The results from this study will help us gain insight into how much U.S. defense attorneys know about 
composite sketches. Through this understanding we hope to aid defense attorneys in their future cases and 
help prevent innocent defendants from being wrongfully convicted. Further, the more people who 
complete the survey, the stronger the conclusions we will be able to make regarding the state of 
knowledge and experience with composite sketch cases. Therefore, if you would like to send this survey 
to other defense attorneys you know, we would be truly appreciative.  
Again, thank you for your participation in this study. If you have further questions, please contact Dr. 
Jennifer Dysart at 212-484-1160 or at jdysart@jjay.cuny.edu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
